Judea Pearl - Collected Quotes

"Despite the prevailing use of graphs as metaphors for communicating and reasoning about dependencies, the task of capturing informational dependencies by graphs is not at all trivial." (Judea Pearl, "Probabilistic Reasoning in Intelligent Systems: Network of Plausible, Inference", 1988)

"Probabilities are summaries of knowledge that is left behind when information is transferred to a higher level of abstraction." (Judea Pearl, "Probabilistic Reasoning in Intelligent Systems: Network of Plausible, Inference", 1988)

"When loops are present, the network is no longer singly connected and local propagation schemes will invariably run into trouble. […] If we ignore the existence of loops and permit the nodes to continue communicating with each other as if the network were singly connected, messages may circulate indefinitely around the loops and process may not converges to a stable equilibrium. […] Such oscillations do not normally occur in probabilistic networks […] which tend to bring all messages to some stable equilibrium as time goes on. However, this asymptotic equilibrium is not coherent, in the sense that it does not represent the posterior probabilities of all nodes of the network." (Judea Pearl, "Probabilistic Reasoning in Intelligent Systems: Network of Plausible, Inference", 1988)

"Traditional statistics is strong in devising ways of describing data and inferring distributional parameters from sample. Causal inference requires two additional ingredients: a science-friendly language for articulating causal knowledge, and a mathematical machinery for processing that knowledge, combining it with data and drawing new causal conclusions about a phenomenon." (Judea Pearl, "Causal inference in statistics: An overview", Statistics Surveys 3, 2009)

"Again, classical statistics only summarizes data, so it does not provide even a language for asking [a counterfactual] question. Causal inference provides a notation and, more importantly, offers a solution. As with predicting the effect of interventions [...], in many cases we can emulate human retrospective thinking with an algorithm that takes what we know about the observed world and produces an answer about the counterfactual world." (Judea Pearl & Dana Mackenzie, "The Book of Why: The new science of cause and effect", 2018)

"Bayesian networks inhabit a world where all questions are reducible to probabilities, or (in the terminology of this chapter) degrees of association between variables; they could not ascend to the second or third rungs of the Ladder of Causation. Fortunately, they required only two slight twists to climb to the top." (Judea Pearl & Dana Mackenzie, "The Book of Why: The new science of cause and effect", 2018)

"Bayesian statistics give us an objective way of combining the observed evidence with our prior knowledge (or subjective belief) to obtain a revised belief and hence a revised prediction of the outcome of the coin’s next toss. [...] This is perhaps the most important role of Bayes’s rule in statistics: we can estimate the conditional probability directly in one direction, for which our judgment is more reliable, and use mathematics to derive the conditional probability in the other direction, for which our judgment is rather hazy. The equation also plays this role in Bayesian networks; we tell the computer the forward  probabilities, and the computer tells us the inverse probabilities when needed." (Judea Pearl & Dana Mackenzie, "The Book of Why: The new science of cause and effect", 2018)

"Deep learning has instead given us machines with truly impressive abilities but no intelligence. The difference is profound and lies in the absence of a model of reality." (Judea Pearl, "The Book of Why: The New Science of Cause and Effect", 2018)

"[…] deep learning has succeeded primarily by showing that certain questions or tasks we thought were difficult are in fact not. It has not addressed the truly difficult questions that continue to prevent us from achieving humanlike AI." (Judea Pearl & Dana Mackenzie, "The Book of Why: The new science of cause and effect", 2018)

"Some scientists (e.g., econometricians) like to work with mathematical equations; others (e.g., hard-core statisticians) prefer a list of assumptions that ostensibly summarizes the structure of the diagram. Regardless of language, the model should depict, however qualitatively, the process that generates the data - in other words, the cause-effect forces that operate in the environment and shape the data generated." (Judea Pearl & Dana Mackenzie, "The Book of Why: The new science of cause and effect", 2018)

"The calculus of causation consists of two languages: causal diagrams, to express what we know, and a symbolic language, resembling algebra, to express what we want to know. The causal diagrams are simply dot-and-arrow pictures that summarize our existing scientific knowledge. The dots represent quantities of interest, called 'variables', and the arrows represent known or suspected causal relationships between those variables - namely, which variable 'listens' to which others." (Judea Pearl & Dana Mackenzie, "The Book of Why: The new science of cause and effect", 2018)

"The main differences between Bayesian networks and causal diagrams lie in how they are constructed and the uses to which they are put. A Bayesian network is literally nothing more than a compact representation of a huge probability table. The arrows mean only that the probabilities of child nodes are related to the values of parent nodes by a certain formula (the conditional probability tables) and that this relation is sufficient. That is, knowing additional ancestors of the child will not change the formula. Likewise, a missing arrow between any two nodes means that they are independent, once we know the values of their parents. [...] If, however, the same diagram has been constructed as a causal diagram, then both the thinking that goes into the construction and the interpretation of the final diagram change." (Judea Pearl & Dana Mackenzie, "The Book of Why: The new science of cause and effect", 2018)

"The transparency of Bayesian networks distinguishes them from most other approaches to machine learning, which tend to produce inscrutable 'black boxes'. In a Bayesian network you can follow every step and understand how and why each piece of evidence changed the network’s beliefs." (Judea Pearl & Dana Mackenzie, "The Book of Why: The new science of cause and effect", 2018)

"When the scientific question of interest involves retrospective thinking, we call on another type of expression unique to causal reasoning called a counterfactual. […] Counterfactuals are the building blocks of moral behavior as well as scientific thought. The ability to reflect on one’s past actions and envision alternative scenarios is the basis of free will and social responsibility. The algorithmization of counterfactuals invites thinking machines to benefit from this ability and participate in this (until now) uniquely human way of thinking about the world." (Judea Pearl & Dana Mackenzie, "The Book of Why: The new science of cause and effect", 2018)

"With Bayesian networks, we had taught machines to think in shades of gray, and this was an important step toward humanlike thinking. But we still couldn’t teach machines to understand causes and effects. [...] By design, in a Bayesian network, information flows in both directions, causal and diagnostic: smoke increases the likelihood of fire, and fire increases the likelihood of smoke. In fact, a Bayesian network can’t even tell what the 'causal direction' is." (Judea Pearl & Dana Mackenzie, "The Book of Why: The new science of cause and effect", 2018)