Disclaimer: The following quotes were consider only in respect to people's understanding about strategy and tactics over time, as best exemplification for understanding the difference between the two concepts.
"What is of supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy's strategy." (Sun Tzu, "The Art of War", 5th century BC)
"Thus those skilled in war subdue the enemy's army without battle. [...] They conquer by strategy." (Sun Tzu, The Art of War, 5th century BC)
"The peak efficiency of knowledge and strategy is to make conflict unnecessary."(Sun Tzu, The Art of War, 5th century BC)
"In warfare, there are no constant conditions. He who can modify his tactics in relation to his opponent will succeed and win." (Sun Tzu, The Art of War, 5th century BC)
"All men can see these tactics whereby I conquer, but what none can see is the strategy out of which victory is evolved." (Sun Tzu, The Art of War, 5th century BC)
"When conventional tactics are altered unexpectedly according to the situation, they take on the element of surprise and increase in strategic value." (Sun Bin, Art of War, cca 4th century BC)
"Everything can collapse. Houses, bodies, and enemies collapse when their rhythm becomes deranged. [...] In large-scale strategy, when the enemy starts to collapse you must pursue him without letting the chance go. If you fail to take advantage of your enemies' collapse, they may recover." (Miyamoto Musashi, "Go Rin No Sho" ["The Book of Five Rings"], 1645)
"In strategy it is important to see distant things as if they were close and to take a distanced view of close things. It is important in strategy to know the enemy's sword and not to be distracted by insignificant movements of his sword. You must study this. The gaze is the same for single combat and for large-scale combat." (Miyamoto Musashi, "Go Rin No Sho" ["The Book of Five Rings"], 1645)
"In all forms of strategy, it is necessary to maintain the combat stance in everyday life and to make your everyday stance your combat stance. You must research this well." (Miyamoto Musashi, "Go Rin No Sho" ["The Book of Five Rings"], 1645)
"In contests of strategy it is bad to be led about by the enemy. You must always be able to lead the enemy about." (Miyamoto Musashi, "Go Rin No Sho" ["The Book of Five Rings"], 1645)
"In strategy your spiritual bearing must not be any different from normal. Both in fighting and in everyday life you should be determined though calm. Meet the situation without tenseness yet not recklessly, your spirit settled yet unbiased. Even when your spirit is calm do not let your body relax, and when your body is relaxed do not let your spirit slacken." (Miyamoto Musashi, "Go Rin No Sho" ["The Book of Five Rings"], 1645)
"In large-scale strategy, it is beneficial to strike at the corners of the enemy's force, If the corners are overthrown, the spirit of the whole body will be overthrown." (Miyamoto Musashi, "Go Rin No Sho" ["The Book of Five Rings"], 1645)
"Many things can cause a loss of balance. One cause is danger, another is hardship, and another is surprise. You must research this.
In large-scale strategy it is important to cause loss of balance. Attack without warning where the enemy is not expecting it, and while his spirit is undecided follow up your advantage and, having the lead, defeat him." (Miyamoto Musashi, "Go Rin No Sho" ["The Book of Five Rings"], 1645)
"Speed is not part of the true Way of strategy. Speed implies that things seem fast or slow, according to whether or not they are in rhythm. Whatever the Way, the master of strategy does not appear fast." (Miyamoto Musashi, "Go Rin No Sho" ["The Book of Five Rings"], 1645)
"Strategy is different from other things in that if you mistake the Way even a little you will become bewildered and fall into bad ways." (Miyamoto Musashi, "Go Rin No Sho" ["The Book of Five Rings"], 1645)
"There is timing in everything. Timing in strategy cannot be mastered without a great deal of practice." (Miyamoto Musashi, "Go Rin No Sho" ["The Book of Five Rings"], 1645)
"The important thing in strategy is to suppress the enemy's useful actions but allow his useless actions." (Miyamoto Musashi, "Go Rin No Sho" ["The Book of Five Rings"], 1645)
"The principles of strategy are written down here in terms of single combat, but you must think broadly so that you attain an understanding for ten-thousand-a-side battles." (Miyamoto Musashi, "Go Rin No Sho" ["The Book of Five Rings"], 1645)
"The wisdom of strategy is different from other things. On the battlefield, even when you are hard-pressed, you should ceaselessly research the principles of strategy so that you can develop a steady spirit." (Miyamoto Musashi, "Go Rin No Sho" ["The Book of Five Rings"], 1645)
"There is timing in the whole life of the warrior, in his thriving and declining, in his harmony and discord. Similarly, there is timing in the Way of the merchant, in the rise and fall of capital. All things entail rising and falling timing. You must be able to discern this. In strategy there are various timing considerations. From the outset you must know the applicable timing and the inapplicable timing, and from among the large and small things and the fast and slow timings find the relevant timing, first seeing the distance timing and the background timing. This is the main thing in strategy. It is especially important to know the background timing, otherwise your strategy will become uncertain." (Miyamoto Musashi, "Go Rin No Sho" ["The Book of Five Rings"], 1645)
"To attain the Way of strategy as a warrior you must study fully other martial arts and not deviate even a little from the Way of the warrior. With your spirit settled, accumulate practice day by day, and hour by hour. Polish the twofold spirit heart and mind, and sharpen the twofold gaze perception and sight. When your spirit is not in the least clouded, when the clouds of bewilderment clear away, there is the true void." (Miyamoto Musashi, "Go Rin No Sho" ["The Book of Five Rings"], 1645)
"'To move the shade' is used when you cannot see the enemy's spirit.
In large-scale strategy, when you cannot see the enemy's position, indicate that you are about to attack strongly, to discover his resources. It is easy then to defeat hin with a different method once you see his resources." (Miyamoto Musashi, "Go Rin No Sho" ["The Book of Five Rings"], 1645)
"When you have attained the way of strategy there will be nothing that you cannot understand. You will see the way in everything." (Miyamoto Musashi, "Go Rin No Sho" ["The Book of Five Rings"], 1645)
"With your spirit open and unconstricted, look at things from a high point of view. You must cultivate your wisdom and spirit. Polish your wisdom: learn public justice, distinguish between good and evil, study the Ways of different arts one by one. When you cannot be deceived by men you will have realised the wisdom of strategy." (Miyamoto Musashi, "Go Rin No Sho" ["The Book of Five Rings"], 1645)
"According to our classification, then, tactics teaches the use of armed forces in the engagement; strategy, the use of engagements for the object of the war." (Carl von Clausewitz, "On War", 1832)
"But when one comes to the effect of the engagement, where material successes turn into motives for further action, the intellect alone is decisive. In brief, tactics will present far fewer difficulties to the theorist than will strategy." (Carl von Clausewitz, "On War", 1832)
"In a tactical situation one is able to see at least half the problem with the naked eye, whereas in strategy everything has to be guessed at and presumed." (Carl von Clausewitz, "On War", 1832)
"Many readers no doubt will consider it superfluous to make such a careful distinction between two things so closely related as tactics and strategy, because they do not directly affect the conduct of operations. Admittedly only the rankest pedant would expect theoretical distinctions to show direct results on the battlefield." (Carl von Clausewitz, "On War", 1832)
"Tactics and strategy are two activities that permeate one another in time and space but are nevertheless essentially different. Their inherent laws and mutual relationship cannot be understood without a total comprehension of both." (Carl von Clausewitz, "On War", 1832)
"The art of war in the narrower sense must now in its turn be broken down into tactics and strategy. The first is concerned with the form of the individual engagement, the second with its use. Both affect the conduct of marches, camps, and billets only through the engagement; they become tactical or strategic questions insofar as they concern either the engagement’s form or its significance. (Carl von Clausewitz, "On War", 1832)
"The conduct of war, then, consists in the planning and conduct of fighting. If fighting consisted of a single act, no further subdivision would be needed. However, it consists of a greater or lesser number of single acts, each complete in itself, which [...] are called ‘engagements’ and which form new entities. This gives rise to the completely different activity of planning and executing these engagements themselves, and of coordinating each of them with the others in order to further the object of the war. One has been called tactics, and the other strategy." (Carl von Clausewitz, "On War", 1832)
"The distinction between tactics and strategy is now almost universal, and everyone knows fairly well where each particular factor belongs without clearly understanding why. Whenever such categories are blindly used, there must be a deep-seated reason for it. We have tried to discover the distinction, and have to say that it was just this common usage that led to it. We reject, on the other hand, the artificial definitions of certain writers, since they find no reflection in general usage." (Carl von Clausewitz, "On War", 1832)
"The theory of major operations (strategy, as it is called) presents extraordinary difficulties, and it is fair to say that very few people have clear ideas about its details - that is, ideas which logically derive from basic necessities." (Carl von Clausewitz, "On War", 1832)
"We have divided the conduct of war into the two fields of tactics and strategy. The theory of the latter, as we have already stated, will unquestionably encounter the greater problems since the former is virtually limited to material factors, whereas for strategic theory, dealing as it does with ends which bear directly on the restoration of peace, the range of possibilities is unlimited. As these ends will have to be considered primarily by the commander-in-chief, the problems mainly arise in those fields that lie within his competence. In the field of strategy, therefore, even more than in tactics, theory will be content with the simple consideration of material and psychological factors, especially where it embraces the highest of achievements." (Carl von Clausewitz, "On War", 1832)
"Such cases also occur in strategy, since strategy is directly linked to tactical action. In strategy too decisions must often be based on direct observation, on uncertain reports arriving hour by hour and day by day, and finally on the actual outcome of battles. It is thus an essential condition of strategic leadership that forces should be held in reserve according to the degree of strategic uncertainty." (Carl von Clausewitz, "On War", 1832)
"Thus, while a tactical reserve is a means not only of meeting any unforeseen manoeuvre by the enemy but also of reversing the unpredictable outcome of combat when this becomes necessary, strategy must renounce this means, at least so far as the overall decision is concerned. Setbacks in one area can, as a rule, be offset only by achieving gains elsewhere, and in a few cases by transferring troops from one area to another. Never must it occur to a strategist to deal with such a setback by holding forces in reserve." (Carl von Clausewitz, "On War", 1832)
"As regards tactics, the principal thing to be attended to is the choice of the most suitable order of battle for the object in view. When we come to consider the action of masses on the field, the means to be used may be an opportune charge of cavalry, a strong battery put in position and unmasked at the proper moment, a column of infantry making a headlong charge, or a deployed division coolly and steadily pouring upon the enemy a fire, or they may consist of tactical maneuvers intended to threaten the enemy’s flanks or rear, or any other maneuver calculated to diminish the confidence of the adversary. Each of these things may, in a particular case, be the cause of victory. To define the cases in which each should be preferred is simply impossible." (Antoine-Henri Jomini, "The Art of War", 1838)
"Every strategic line of defense should always possess a tactical point upon which to rally for defense should the enemy cross the strategic front. (Antoine-Henri Jomini, "The Art of War", 1838)
"Grand tactics is the art of making good combinations preliminary to battles, as well as during their progress. The guiding principle in tactical combinations, as in those of strategy, is to bring the mass of the force in hand against a part of the opposing army, and upon that point the possession of which promises the most important results. (Antoine-Henri Jomini, "The Art of War", 1838)
"Strategy, or the art of properly directing masses upon the theater of war, either for defense or for invasion. […] Strategy is the art of making war upon the map, and comprehends the whole theater of operations. Grand Tactics is the art of posting troops upon the battle-field according to the accidents of the ground, of bringing them into action, and the art of fighting upon the ground, in contradistinction to planning upon a map. Its operations may extend over a field of ten or twelve miles in extent. Logistics comprises the means and arrangements which work out the plans of strategy and tactics. Strategy decides where to act; logistics brings the troops to this point; grand tactics decides the manner of execution and the employment of the troops." (Antoine-Henri Jomini, "The Art of War", 1838)
"Strategy embraces the following points, viz.:–
1. The selection of the theater of war, and the discussion of the different combinations of which it admits.
2. The determination of the decisive points in these combinations, and the most favorable direction for operations.
3. The selection and establishment of the fixed base and of the zone of operations.
4. The selection of the objective point, whether offensive or defensive.
5. The strategic fronts, lines of defense, and fronts of operations.
6. The choice of lines of operations leading to the objective point or strategic front.
7. For a given operation, the best strategic line, and the different maneuvers necessary to embrace all possible cases.
8. The eventual bases of operations and the strategic reserves.
9. The marches of armies, considered as maneuvers.
10. The relation between the position of depots and the marches of the army.
11. Fortresses regarded as strategical means, as a refuge for an army, as an obstacle to its progress: the sieges to be made and to be covered.
12. Points for intrenched camps, tétes de pont, &c.
13. The diversions to be made, and the large detachments necessary.
The maneuvering of an army upon the battle-field, and the different formations of troops for attack, constitute Grand Tactics. Logistics is the art of moving armies. It comprises the order and details of marches and camps, and of quartering and supplying troops; in a word, it is the execution of strategical and tactical enterprises." (Antoine-Henri Jomini, "The Art of War", 1838)
"[…] the art of war consists of six distinct parts:–
1. Statesmanship in its relation to war.
2. Strategy, or the art of properly directing masses upon the theater of×war, either for defense or for invasion.
3. Grand Tactics.
4. Logistics, or the art of moving armies.
5. Engineering,–the attack and defense of fortifications.
6. Minor Tactics." (Antoine-Henri Jomini, "The Art of War", 1838)
"The science of strategy consists, in the first place, in knowing how to choose well a theater of war and to estimate correctly that of the enemy. To do this, a general must accustom himself to decide as to the importance of decisive points […]." (Antoine-Henri Jomini, "The Art of War", 1838)
"The study of the principles of strategy can produce no valuable practical results if we do nothing more than keep them in remembrance, never trying to apply them, with map in hand, to hypothetical wars, or to the brilliant operations of great captains. By such exercises may be procured a rapid and certain strategic coup-d’oeil,–the most valuable characteristic of a good general, without which he can never put in practice the finest theories in the world." (Antoine-Henri Jomini, "The Art of War", 1838)
"Strategy is the most important department of the art of war, and strategical skill is the highest and rarest function of military genius. (George S Hillard, "Life and Campaigns of George B. McClellan, Major-general U. S. Army", 1864)
"The tactical result of an engagement forms the base for new strategic decisions because victory or defeat in a battle changes the situation to such a degree that no human acumen is able to see beyond the first battle." (Helmuth von Moltke, "Über Strategie" ["On Strategy"], 1871)
"The world is a multiplicity, a harvest-field, a battle-ground; and thence arises through human contact ways of numbering, or mathematics, ways of tillage, or agriculture, ways of fighting, or military tactics and strategy, and these are incorporated in individuals as habits of life." (George Edward Woodberry, "The Torch, and Other Lectures and Addresses", 1920)
"Nine-tenths of tactics are certain, and taught in books: but the irrational tenth is like the kingfisher flashing across the pool, and that is the test of generals. It can only be ensured by instinct, sharpened by thought practicing the stroke so often that at the crisis it is as natural as a reflex." (Thomas E Lawrence, "The Evolution of A Revolt", 1920)
"In a physical contest on the field of battle it is allowable to use tactics and strategy, to retreat as well as advance, to have recourse to a ruse as well as open attack; but in matters of principle there can be no tactics, there is one straight forward course to follow and that course must be found and followed without swerving to the end." (Terence MacSwiney, "Principles of Freedom", 1921)
"The field of consciousness is tiny. It accepts only one problem at a time. Get into a fist fight, put your mind on the strategy of the fight, and you will not feel the other fellow's punches." (Antoine de Saint-Exupéry, "Flight to Arras", 1942)
"Keep the pressure on, with different tactics and actions, and utilize all events of the period for your purpose." (Saul Alinsky, "Thirteen Tactics for Realistic Radicals: from Rules for Radicals", 1971)
"As in war, strategic success depends on tactical effectiveness, and no degree of planning can lessen management's tactical imperatives. The first responsibility of the executive, anyway, is to the here and now. If he makes a shambles of the present, there may be no future; and the real purpose of planning - the one whose neglect is common, but poisonous - is to safeguard and sustain the company in subsequent short-run periods." (Robert Heller, "The Naked Manager: Games Executives Play", 1972)
"It is necessary to develop a strategy that utilizes all the physical conditions and elements that are directly at hand. The best strategy relies upon an unlimited set of responses." (Morihei Ueshiba, "The Art of Peace", 1991)
"Grand strategy is the art of looking beyond the present battle and calculating ahead. Focus on your ultimate goal and plot to reach it." (Robert Greene, "The 33 Strategies of War", 2006)
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